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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 14-1063 
____________ 
 
SOON PARK, 
                                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; 
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANES DOES 1-10 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. No. 2-10-cv-06762) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2014 
 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 4, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Soon Park appeals the District Court’s summary judgment on her Title VII claim 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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for national origin discrimination. We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by 
Judge Debevoise in his thoughtful opinion.  
I 
 Park works as a medical technologist at the James J. Peters VA Medical Center in 
Bronx, New York (the VA), where she has been employed since 1992.  Originally from 
South Korea, Park has somewhat limited fluency in English.  She alleged that she has 
been the target of workplace harassment over the course of her employment with the VA. 
Although a few of the incidents she cited have no arguable connection to her national 
origin, some do. Specifically, she claimed that one of her supervisors, Darryl Williams, 
was “against her” and tried to “sabotage” her, would pretend not to understand her 
English, and once scolded her for failing to distinguish between the words “order” and 
“odor.”  She also alleged that Williams asked her whether all Koreans were infected by 
“that special fungus” when she had an infection.  Finally, Park experienced situations in 
which other VA personnel told her they could not understand her English. 
 According to Park, the harassment did not cease when she left work. She claimed 
that she saw Williams inside her bedroom at home (although the bedroom door was 
locked from the inside).  Park also believed that she was occasionally followed home 
from work. On one occasion, Park called another supervisor, Dr. Azra Shahidi, late at 
night to advise that if she did not report to work the next morning, “something happened 
to me.”  Dr. Shahidi recommended that Park see a therapist, but Park refused, worried 
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that doing so might harm her reputation in the Korean community. 
 The alleged sabotage and harassment culminated with Park’s involuntary 
commitment to the psychiatric ward of the VA hospital in 2008.  One morning that year, 
Park had a conversation with a coworker, Luis Benabe, during which he told her that the 
VA knew many personal things about her and that there were cameras installed in her 
home.  Park responded that these issues would continue until she died and asked why she 
had to die to make them stop; Benabe told her if she wanted to die, she should starve 
herself to death.  Park, believing that the conversation was in jest, responded that she 
could not kill herself, but instead would have to die in a tragic accident.  She also asked 
whether Benabe knew anyone planning to blow up an airplane.1 
 Benabe subsequently reported the conversation to Williams, telling him that Park 
had asked about suicide methods.  Williams reported the conversation to Dr. Shahidi, who 
decided that they needed to take action to prevent a possible suicide by Park, and 
summoned a VA supervisor and a mental health care worker to meet with Park. Id. Park 
then was brought into an office with the mental health worker, who attempted to ask her 
about the conversation with Benabe. Park repeatedly said that she had “no comment.”  
Finally, after she relented and began conversing with the mental health worker, 
psychiatrist Dr. James Chou came to speak with Park.  Dr. Chou eventually coaxed Park 
                                                 
1 Benabe recalls the tone and content of his conversation with Park differently, but for 
the purposes of her appeal, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to Park. 
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into the emergency room of the VA hospital to conduct a complete evaluation.  At the 
conclusion of the evaluation (and after many statements of extreme paranoia by Park), 
Park told Dr. Chou that if she were actually suicidal, she would not tell anyone. 
 At that point, Dr. Chou decided that Park was mentally ill and was exhibiting 
“suicidal ideation.”  She was not allowed to leave the emergency room in spite of her 
energetic protestations and was eventually admitted to the VA’s psychiatric ward, where 
she was supposed to be monitored for 72 hours on suicide watch.  Park was released after 
just one night, however, after her cousin (a lawyer) convinced the hospital to release her.  
Park returned to work the following day without incident.  She was subsequently asked to 
take a leave of absence, returning to work six months later, in April 2009, after another 
psychiatrist deemed her fit for work. 
 A year and a half later, Park filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, alleging national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The District Court entered 
summary judgment against Park on December 16, 2013, holding that she could not make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination. This timely appeal followed.2 
II 
 We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo and apply the same 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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standard as the District Court. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 Central to Park’s case is the notion that her involuntary commitment was the result 
of national origin discrimination. The District Court, after correctly explaining the 
analytical framework for a Title VII claim based on adverse employment action, held that 
Park failed to establish a prima facie case under Title VII because she could not show the 
required nexus between her national origin and her involuntary commitment. Park v. 
Shinseki, 2013 WL 6627604, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2013). Park contends that this 
decision was incorrect because it “ignored the surrounding harassment leading up to [her] 
involuntary commitment.” Appellant’s Br. 23. We disagree. 
 As the District Court aptly stated, “the record suggests that [Park’s commitment] 
had everything to do with the fact that she suffered from paranoid delusions and had been 
mentioning the notion of suicide to her coworkers,” and nothing to do with her status as a 
Korean immigrant. Park, 2013 WL 6627604, at *6. Park repeatedly shared paranoid 
thoughts with her coworkers and supervisors (including believing that she was being 
followed home, and that she had seen Williams inside her bedroom). She engaged in a 
lengthy, albeit joking, conversation with Benabe about how she might bring about her 
own death in order to make her problems go away. The record shows that these events led 
to Park’s involuntary commitment. By contrast, the alleged discriminatory conduct is 
unrelated to her commitment because Dr. Chou, who convinced Park to go to the 
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emergency room, had no connection whatsoever to the alleged harassment. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Dr. Chou harbored any discriminatory animus toward Koreans. 
Because Park failed to show any nexus between her national origin and her involuntary 
commitment, the District Court did not err when it held that she did not establish a prima 
facie case. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n.6 
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 & n.13 (1973) (noting 
that while the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination vary based on 
the facts of a case, a plaintiff must show circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination—that is, a nexus between the plaintiff’s protected trait and the adverse 
employment action). 
 Park argues on appeal that the District Court improperly found that “it was in fact 
medically necessary to commit” her and insists that her commitment was unnecessary. 
Appellant’s Br. 23. This argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, Park is simply 
incorrect that the District Court found that her commitment was medically necessary—the 
District Court made no such finding (nor did it need to). Instead, it ruled only that there 
was no connection between her commitment and her national origin. And second, 
whether or not the commitment was medically necessary is irrelevant. The critical 
question under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is whether Park has cited facts 
sufficient to give rise to an inference that her commitment was based on her status as a 
Korean immigrant. 411 U.S. at 802. She failed to do so, primarily because the 
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connections she attempts to make between her alleged harassment and her commitment 
lack support in the record. Even if her commitment was medically unnecessary, it was 
still based upon her perceived mental instability and suicidal ideation, not her national 
origin, as the District Court rightly noted. Thus, she failed to show the required elements 
of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. 
 Park also argues on appeal that she was discriminated against under a hostile work 
environment theory. To make out this claim, Park must show that the harassment she 
suffered was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” that it effectively altered the terms and 
conditions of her employment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
Most of the incidents Park cites as harassment stem from her limited fluency in English. 
These incidents fall far short of the “severe or pervasive” standard required to make out a 
hostile environment claim. A language barrier between coworkers may cause difficulties 
in the workplace, but as the District Court noted, accounting for a language barrier does 
not amount to unlawful discrimination. Park, 2013 WL 6627604, at *6. 
 Park does point to one incident—when Williams asked her whether all Koreans 
were infected by a fungus—that supports her claim of intentional national origin 
discrimination. But that comment was neither severe nor pervasive enough to support a 
hostile environment claim because “Title VII is not violated by the ‘mere utterance of 
an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ or by mere 
‘discourtesy or rudeness . . . .’” Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 
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265, 280 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 
(1998)). The inappropriate fungus remark was a classic stray comment and is insufficient 
to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (“[S]imple 
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are mindful that ‘offhanded comments, and isolated incidents (unless 
extremely serious)’ are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim.” 
(quoting id.)).  
 Finally, Park makes a procedural argument, namely, that the District Court should 
not have granted summary judgment because the VA failed to furnish a statement of 
material facts not in dispute with its motion for summary judgment as required by the 
District of New Jersey’s Local Civil Rule 56.1. Park claims that she was prejudiced by the 
VA’s failure to file a Rule 56.1 statement because she was forced to use the VA’s brief to 
ascertain which facts were undisputed and because, more importantly, there was no clear 
factual record on which the District Court could rule. We disagree because Park’s 
argument ignores the procedural context of the case. The VA moved to dismiss Park’s 
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (a motion for which no 
statement of undisputed material facts is required) or, alternatively, for summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The District Court correctly decided that, because it was 
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asked to consider evidence outside the pleadings, it would treat the motion as one for 
summary judgment. Park, 2013 WL 6627604, at *5 n.6.  
 Moreover, although the VA did not submit a Rule 56.1 statement, it did submit a 
“Statement of Relevant Facts,” to which Park responded with her own “Statement of 
Genuine Issues.” Park’s Statement of Genuine Issues contains 57 numbered paragraphs 
responding to each fact asserted in the VA’s Statement of Relevant Facts, and noting 
which facts were undisputed. Thus, between the VA’s and Park’s submissions, the 
District Court had a clear record of the facts on which to rule. Accordingly, we find no 
prejudice caused by the absence of a Rule 56.1 statement. Given that the VA made its 
Rule 56 motion in the alternative to its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it was within the District 
Court’s discretion to convert the VA’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment. And we conclude that its decision not to require a separate Rule 56.1 
statement—especially given that the VA substantially complied with Rule 56.1 via its 
Statement of Relevant Facts—did not constitute error.  
III 
 The District Court aptly addressed the arguments raised by Park. Because we are 
unpersuaded by Park’s substantive and procedural arguments, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
